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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (as amended 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The proper issue before this Court is much broader than that stated by Appellant: 
ISSUE #1: 
The first issue is whether the District Court was correct in its analysis that summary 
judgment was proper because reasonable minds could not differ in the conclusion that the 
evidence adduced by Clegg was simply insufficient to sustain his legal claim. See Rose v. 
Provo City, 61 P.3d 1017, 1020 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Lamarr v. UDOT, 828 P.2d 
535, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) mdFerre v. State, ISA P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)). There 
is simply no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 
for a jury to return a favorable verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 249 
(1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary 
judgment is appropriate. Id. at 250, see also AMS Salt Ind., Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of 
America, 942 P.2d 315, 320 (Utah 1997). Such conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632, 635 (Utah 2002) (citations omitted). 
ISSUE #2: 
Whether the District Court properly determined Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14 was 
constitutional as applied to this case. "Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Wood v. University 
of Utah Medical Center, 61 P.3d 436, 440 (Utah 2002) (citing Grand County v. Emeiy 
County, 52 P.3d 1148 (Utah 2002). "Furthermore, we presume the legislation being 
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challenged is constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality. Id. 
ISSUE #3 
Whether the District Court properly granted Defendants' Motion to Strike the 
Affidavit of Kevin Robson, attorney for plaintiff, on the basis that it was unopposed by 
Plaintiff before the trial court. This issue was not preserved for appeal. The general rule is 
that "issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal." Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996). Further, since an affidavit is simply a method of 
placing evidence of fact before the court, the standard of review varies depending on the type 
of evidence at issue. In re Water Rights vs. Springville Municipal Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 
(Utah 1999). In civil cases, where the evidence sought to be introduced does not raise 
concerns of heightened standards of sensitivity such as Fourth Amendment concerns, the trial 
court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion. Id. 
ISSUE #4 
Whether the District Court properly denied Plaintiffs Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of Todd Bonner as the Affidavit complied with the requirements of Rule 56(e). The 
interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Brown v. 
Jorgensen, 136 P.3d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). As to the evidence admitted, the trial court 
is granted broad discretion. In re Water Rights, 982 P.2d at 72. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below. 
Steven Clegg, Plaintiff and Appellant herein (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff or 
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"Clegg"), filed a Complaint on or about September 2,2003, alleging that Defendant Travis 
Jensen, a Wasatch County Sheriffs Deputy (hereinafter "Defendant" or "Deputy Jensen"), 
breached a duty of "extraordinary care" owed to Plaintiff when he exceeded the speed limit 
after being dispatched to an injury accident in the Lake Creek area of Wasatch County. 
R.003,004. Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that Deputy Jensen was running with his lights 
and siren on as he traveled east on SRI 13 from Midway to Heber City. R.004, 005. Clegg 
told the UHP investigating officers that he saw and heard Deputy Jensen's lights and siren, 
but testified at deposition that ne never saw the lights and only heard the siren prior to the 
collision; nevertheless, he pulled from 750 East and into the eastbound lane of SRI 13 to 
make a left turn, directly in the path of oncoming traffic, partially blocking the lane and 
creating an imminent hazard for Deputy Jensen. With traffic also occupying the westbound 
lane and Clegg blocking the eastbound lane, Deputy Jensen attempted to go around Clegg 
on the right, but struck Clegg's Landrover in the left rear panel and then went off the road. 
Although Clegg declined medical treatment and examination at the scene, his Complaint 
alleges it caused mental and physical injury from which he is now impaired. R.003,002. 
Wasatch County filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of governmental 
immunity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15), combined with Plaintiffs violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75 when he entered the eastbound lanes of SRI 13 before the 
westbound lanes were clear and, by his own testimony, continued rolling forward once he 
spotted the police car. R.131-139. 
Plaintiff filed an opposition memorandum in which he admitted the statement of facts, 
but objected to any use or reference to the accident report and/or witness statements in 
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support of those facts as inadmissible hearsay. R.228-225. Plaintiff challenged the 
constitutionality of §§ 41-6-14 (1993) and 63-30-10(15)(1991) as applied to the case and 
further alleged that Deputy Jensen had violated the policies of the Sheriffs Department 
Manual by exceeding the speed limit by more than 20 miles per hour. R.216. In its Reply, 
the Defendants submitted an Affidavit in support of the witness statements the Plaintiff 
objected to in his Opposition memorandum and responded to the constitutional challenge. 
R.23 8-252. Plaintiff requested an opportunity to depose the Affiant, Kameron Kohler, which 
was granted and the parties proceeded with the supplemental discovery outside of the 
scheduling order. R. 285, 020-22. 
On October 30,2006, the district court issued a request for Supplemental Briefing on 
the applicability of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office Manual. R.273-75. In his 
Supplemental Memorandum, Clegg argued the Manual had the force of a legislative 
enactment or administrative regulation and that Clegg was an "innocent" motorist intended 
for its protection. He also argued that it was "undisputed" that Deputy Jensen violated the 
provisions of the Sheriffs Manual. R.290-91. Deputy Jensen filed his Opposition or 
Responsive memorandum and included the Affidavit of Chief Deputy Todd Bonner from the 
Wasatch County Sheriffs Office regarding the Sheriffs Manual and referencing Clegg5 s 
citation for the accident testified to by both parties' expert witnesses. R.331. 
On December 1,2006, Plaintiff submitted the Affidavit of his attorney, Kevin Robson, 
a motion to Strike the Affidavit of Chief Bonner or to depose the witness, as well as a motion 
for leave to file a Reply to Deputy Jensen's Response to Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Memorandum. R.294-334,360-67,368-71,335-59. Simultaneously, Plaintiff submitted his 
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Reply memorandum based on the affidavit of his attorney, Kevin Robson, averring to the 
population of Midway, its general population character and whether the Hamlet 
condominiums were occupied at the time of the accident in July 2002. R.335-59, 372-76. 
Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs Reply, as it was based on speculation and 
conjecture and violated the witness-advocate prohibition of Rule 3.7 of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct and moved to strike the Affidavit of Kevin Robson. R.422,430. The 
Plaintiff filed no memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of Kevin Robson. 
On April 19, 2007, the district court heard oral argument on the motions, denying 
Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavit of Todd Bonner, granting Defendants' motion to 
strike the Affidavit of Kevin Robson and granting Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment. R.437, 440. Judgment was entered on May 3, 2007 and Notice of Appeal was 
timely submitted on May 23, 2007. R.44-442. 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. On July 16, 2002 at approximately 3:22 p.m., Wasatch County Sheriffs 
Deputy Travis Jensen was dispatched to an injury accident in the Lake Creek/Timber Lakes 
area of Wasatch County. R.126 (Deposition of Xela Reid, 22-24, including transcript of 
dispatch tape recording). 
2. Deputy Jensen left Midway City traveling east on SRI 13 in an authorized 
Wasatch County emergency vehicle, with his overhead light bar on, his wigwag headlights 
on, and his siren sounding as he headed toward the Lake Creek area via Heber City. R. 122, 
123 (Deposition of Travis Jensen, pp. 10-12, 19:18-24); R.116 (Deposition of Newell 
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Knight1, 49:8-16); R.107 (Deposition of Steven Clegg, 30:6-14, 31:15-17, 39:21-25 and 
Clegg's UHP Witness Statement); R.102 (UHP Witness Statement of Kameron Kohler); R. 
100 (UHP Witness statement of Brent Neering); R.233-34 (Affidavit of Kameron Kohler). 
3. Clegg volunteered in his statement to UHP Troopers that the "Sheriff appeared 
lights and siren going." R. 104. He testified in his deposition that he never heard the siren, 
but saw the flashing lights and headlights after the vehicle was sliding towards him. R. 107. 
He later admitted he heard the siren. R. 107 {Id. at 31:15-17). The independent witnesses 
agreed the lights and siren were visible and audible. R. 100-2. Clegg's retained expert, 
Newell Knight, testified the Deputy's lights were on and siren was audible. R. 115-16 
(Deposition of Knight at 56:19-22). 
4. Kameron Kohler, an independent witness to the accident, avers that he heard 
and saw the emergency vehicle and pulled to the side of the road; when the police car passed, 
he pulled back onto SRI 13 right behind Deputy Jensen. R.102,233-34 (Kohler's Statement 
and Affidavit). 
5. Clegg had been visiting the Hamlet Condominiums to solicit title business for 
his employer, Old Republic Title Company. R.109 (Deposition of Clegg, pp. 20-21). Clegg 
was leaving the Hamlet Condominium complex via 750 East, planning to make a left-hand 
turn onto SRI 13 and go westbound into Midway. R. 108-09 (Deposition of Clegg at pp. 21-
25). The street identified as 750 East is controlled by a stop sign where it intersects with 
SRI 13. Id.. 
6. Clegg testified in his deposition that he came to a complete stop at the stop 
1
 Newell Knight is Plaintiffs retained expert for accident reconstruction. 
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sign. R.108 (Id. at pg. 26). He testified that he saw traffic in the westbound lanes. R.106 
(Id. at 32:16-19); R.108 (Id. at 26:1-4); R.109 (Id. at 22:14-15). But he had to edge forward 
from the stop sign to see eastbound traffic. Id. 
7. Ron Probert testified that Clegg's visibility of eastbound traffic from the stop 
sign was 300 feet, but this jumped to well over 700 feet when he moved forward to the bike 
path line. R. 151 (Deposition of Probert at 22:3-11). Newell Knight testified Clegg could 
see the car for "600 hundred feet I think was the distance it can be seen up there." R.176 
(Deposition of Knight at 17:3). 
8. Kameron Kohler avers in his Affidavit that Clegg had pulled out of 750 East 
and into the eastbound lane of SRI 13 and then "froze" when he saw the police car. R. 233-
34 (Affidavit of Kameron Kohler, f 4). "The driver just sat there blocking the eastbound 
travel lane." Id. 
9. According to Kohler, Deputy Jensen, and the Plaintiff, there was traffic in the 
westbound lane of SRI 13. R.233 (Kohler Affidavit) ;R.261 (Deposition ofKohler at 22:10-
21); R.106, 108-09 (Deposition of Clegg at 22); R.121 (Deposition of Deputy Jensen at 
39:24). Any attempt by Deputy Jensen to go left into the westbound lane to go around Clegg 
would have resulted in a head-on collision with westbound traffic. R.233 (Kohler Affidavit, 
1f4-6); R.261 (Deposition ofKohler at 22:10-21); R.121 (Deposition of Deputy Jensen at 
39:24). Deputy Jensen was forced to go around Clegg's vehicle on the right, but struck the 
Landrover in the left rear panel and then went off the road and into the grass. Id.; (Affidavit 
of Kameron Kohler, 1f5-6, "The car saw the cop coming, hit his brakes and stopped in the 
road; so the cop took the inside route, there was no avoiding a collision, but he picked the 
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better of two poor available choices.") 
10. The Utah Highway Patrol (UHP) investigated the accident and found that 
Clegg had entered the eastbound lane of SRI 13 and "then stopped partially blocking the 
travel lane." R.96-98 (Accident Report2)^. 114-15 (Deposition ofNewell Knight at 57, 58, 
"there is no question Clegg was partially blocking the travel lane of eastbound SRI 13."). 
11. UHP Trooper Richard Beveridge filed a complaint against Plaintiff for "failure 
to yield the right of way" to vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75. R.094-93. On January 20, 2003, the Heber City 
Justice Court "diverted" the case for 12 months; with a "possible chance the case will be 
refiled." R.09-91. 
12. UHP Troopers Beveridge and Kelsey's retained accident reconstructionist Ron 
Probert, witness Kameron Kohler, and Deputy Jensen all agreed Deputy Jensen's speed 
equaled or exceeded the 50 mile per hour posted speed limit where the collision occurred, 
but did not exceed the posted speed by more than 20 miles per hour. R. 150,152-53 (Probert 
Deposition and Interview of Troopers at 14-15:17-19,18:14-22,26:6-10, "Troopers Kelsey 
and Beveridge indicated to me they thought the calculations were too high;""Deputy Jensen5 s 
speed was 10 to 20 miles per hour less than what the officers calculated."); R.263 (Kohler 
2
 Plaintiff argues the UHP accident report is inadmissible under Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6a-404(4)(a). However, the Plaintiffs retained expert, Newell Knight, testified that he did 
no independent investigation and took no independent measurements. He relied entirely on 
the calculations and investigation recorded in the UHP accident report in arriving at his 
opinion. Therefore, the contents of the report are admissible as it is the data upon which Mr. 
Knight relied for his opinion. See Day v. Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 408 P.2d 186, 223 
(Utah 1965); Lamb v. Bangert, 525 P.2d 602, 607-8 (Utah 1984); Highland Constr. Co. v. 
Union Pacific Railroad, 683 P.2dc 1042 (Utah 1984); UtahR.Evid. 701, 702. 
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Deposition, 13:21 -24,14:9-10; "I pulled in right behind [the deputy]. J would guess his speed 
was 45 to 50."); R. 234 (Kohler Affidavit K 3, "The cop was going about 45-50 mph as it 
approached 750 East."); R.191 (Jensen Deposition, 23-24:25-1, "Just prior to the accident, 
I did notice my speed and it was between 55 and 60 miles an hour."3). 
13. The longest skid marks measured by the UHP Troopers was 205 feet, the 
shortest one is about 177 feet; speed was calculated using the 205 foot measurement. R. 153 
(Probert Deposition at 16-17:23-2). 
14. Probert testified that he and the UHP Troopers who investigated the accident 
agreed the 78 mph speed recorded on the accident report was incorrect, it was abnormally 
high given the evidence. R.153 (Probert Deposition at 14-15). Based on Probert's 
calculations the speed wras approximately 10 to 15 miles per hour lower than the speed 
recorded on the report, perhaps as much as 20 miles per hour less, or 58 to 68 miles per 
hour.4 R.150, 152 {Id. atl8:ll-20, 26:6-10). 
3
 Mr. Clegg argues in his Appellant's Brief that Deputy Jensen testified he didn't 
disagree with the Troopers' calculation of his speed. The actual testimony is as follows: 
Q: Do you believe that they [calculated your speed] accurately? 
A: I -1 can't say. I wasn't part of that. I wasn't part of that investigation. 
Q: Let me ask you this question then: Do you disagree that you were traveling 78 
mph? 
A: I can't say that I disagree. The last speed I noted was 60 miles an hour. The 
only - that's - the only thing I can go by is what I last saw and what they are 
saying now. 
R.191 (Jensen Deposition at 24:15-25. 
4
 Probert's calculation referenced by Clegg at pg. 4 of Appellant's Brief, stating that 
"Probert calculated Jensen's speed at 80 mph, was based on a hypothetical presented by 
Plaintiff, assuming the following parameters: a drag factor of .7, 303 feet of skid mark, all 
wheels locked up, and no change in surface after impact. R. 150 (Probert Deposition at 26-
27). However, Probert testified: "I already said I thought [Jensen] was going less than what 
the officers calculated him at...whether that's 20 over- let me back up. Whether that's 15 
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15. Newell Knight, Plaintiffs retained expert, testified that he did not 
independently attempt to calculate the speed of either vehicle, he simply adopted the results 
as recorded on the accident report. R.172 (UQ: Did you calculate or measure any of these 
parameters yourself? "A. I did not.", Deposition of Newell Knight, at 34:2-13; "Q: You're 
relying specifically on the accident report? A. That's right.", Id. at 34:16-18; "Q: Relying on 
the accident report and field diagram, how do you interpret the data and how they came to 
the drag factor? Do you agree or disagree? A: Well, that's the result they got", Id. at 37:2-8; 
UQ. You didn't do an independent study of it? A: No, no", Id. at 37:10-11. Moreover, Mr. 
Knight testified that he did not interview the Troopers regarding the reliability or credibility 
of either their testing or the equipment used; nor did he attempt to confirm the results. R. 174 
(Id. at 27:22-24). Finally, Mr. Knight testified Clegg had entered the intersection and was 
partially blocking the road, not "stopped at the intersection," or "behind the white fog line" 
as stated in Plaintiffs Appellant's Brief. R.166 (Knight Deposition at 58:6-8). 
16. Knight testified that Jensen could have gone around Clegg, going "on the 
wrong side of the road" and the oncoming traffic could "move to the right" to avoid the 
emergency vehicle. R.166 (Id. at 59:9-18). 
17. The Wasatch County Sheriffs Office prepared the EMERGENCY AND PURSUIT 
DRIVING MANUAL ("Manual") in conformance with the standards established by the 
Department of Public Safety, Division of Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) and 
the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14(4)(b). R.325 (Affidavit of Chief 
Deputy Todd Bonner). Section 3-3-01.02 of the Manual provides: 
over, 20 or 25 over, I don't know that." Id. 
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The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of 
an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the 
vehicle with regard for the safety of all persons, nor protect the 
driver from the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of 
privileged declared in this section. 
R.204. Section 3-3-01.05 of the Manual provides that no deputy will drive more than 20 mph 
over the posted speed limit in any populated area of the county or in any city. Id.\ R.120 
(Jensen Deposition at 44:1-7).5 
18. Mr. Knight testified that if Jensen had been going 60 miles per hour he would 
have been able to stop for Clegg short of impact. R.170 (Knight Deposition at 43:20-23). 
19. There is no evidence that Deputy Jensen violated the provisions of the Wasatch 
County Sheriffs Office Manual on emergency driving. R. 150,152-53 (Probert Deposition 
at 14-15:17-19,18:11-20,26:6-10); R.325 (Affidavit of Chief Bonner); R.234,263 (Kohler 
Deposition at 13:21-24, 14:9-10 and Kohler Affidavit); R.191 (Jensen Deposition at 23-
24:25-1). 
20. Chief Deputy Todd Bonner averred that the area of 750 East was not 
considered "populated" for the application of the speed restriction set forth in § 3-3-01.05 (1). 
R.324. Regardless, the deputies are trained to drive at a speed that is reasonable and prudent 
considering the existing conditions. Id. 
21. Brad Wilson, Midway City Recorder, averred that the zoning map for the 
5
 In Deputy Jensen's deposition, he stated that the policy states deputies could exceed 
the speed limit by 20 mph only in populated areas, but stated, in response to questioning, that 
he did not believe he ever exceeded the speed limit by more than 20 miles per hour. Counsel 
for the Plaintiff did not misunderstand the response at the time of the deposition, but 
persistently argues in pleadings and now in his Brief that Jensen is "confused" by the Policy 
and believes he can speed in populated areas. The transcript contains a simple typographical 
error that should have read "un" populated areas. R. 120 (Jensen Deposition at 44:1-7). 
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period of time including July 2002 when this accident occurred, classifies the area as "RA-1-
43", or "residential/agricultural." R.402. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
All available evidence in this case confirms that Deputy Jensen was dispatched to an 
emergency. He traveled eastbound on the highway between Midway and Heber City, SRI 13, 
with his overhead light bar on, his wigwag lights on and his siren sounding. Two independent 
witnesses confirm the lights and siren were visible and audible. As Jensen approached 750 
East, Clegg pulled into the eastbound lane of SRI 13, partially blocking the road and 
preventing eastbound traffic, including Deputy Jensen, from proceeding eastbound without 
moving into the westbound lanes. The westbound lanes were occupied with oncoming 
traffic. Rather than risk a head-on collision, Jensen attempted to go behind Clegg's vehicle 
as Clegg continued to roll forward, but Deputy Jensen was unable to avoid Clegg's vehicle 
and struck the left rear panel before going off the road. The subsequent investigation by 
UHP Troopers and retained expert Ron Probert confirmed that Jensen did not exceed the 50 
mph speed limit by 20 mph; the 20 mph prohibition in the Wasatch County Sheriffs 
Department Manual was irrelevant to the case, since Plaintiffs own expert testified the 
accident would have occurred at any speed greater than 60 mph, or 10 mph over the posted 
speed limit. Most importantly, it was the Plaintiffs own conduct, not the speed or conduct 
of Deputy Jensen, that caused the accident. 
Plaintiffs factual claims to the contrary are wholly unsupported by the evidence. 
Therefore, he directs his challenge, not to the merits of the case, but to a challenge to the 
constitutionality of § 41-6-14(2) of the Utah Code and, to the extent it relies on § 41-6-14(2) 
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for immunity to emergency vehicles, § 63-30-10(15) of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. The legislative history does not support the Plaintiffs argument that the "legislature 
realized it was still unconstitutional" when it revised § 41 -6-14 in 2004. On the contrary, the 
case law supports the district court's conclusion that the statute was and is constitutional as 
applied to this case and summary judgment was proper. 
Moreover, Defendants' Motion to Strike the Robson Affidavit was unopposed, in 
addition to its noncompliance with Rule 56(e) and its violation of the witness-advocate 
prohibition of Rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. As to the court's grant of 
Deputy Todd Bonner's Affidavit, it conformed with the requirements of Rule 56(e) and 
Plaintiff failed to cite to any authority to his argument that it was improperly filed. Inasmuch 
as an affidavit is simply a method of placing evidence of a fact before the court, the trial 
court's decision to admit the evidence in Todd Bonner's Affidavit did not abuse its broad 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs motion to strike. See In re General Determination of Water 
Rights, 982 P.2d at 72. 
The district court's findings and Order are clearly supported by the facts and firmly 
established legal principals and should be affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CLEGG FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN HIS 
CLAIM THAT DEPUTY JENSEN WAS LIABLE FOR ANY INJURY CLEGG 
SUSTAINED WHEN HE PULLED ONTO SRI 13 BEFORE IT WAS CLEAR 
OF TRAFFIC. 
A. Evidence Confirms Plaintiffs Claims are Barred by the Governmental 
Immunity Act, § 63-30-10(15). 
The Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Wasatch County Deputy Sheriff Travis Jensen, 
owed Plaintiff "a duty of extraordinary care" in pursuit of his duties as a law enforcement officer. 
R.003-4. The basis for Plaintiffs negligence claim is that Deputy Jensen was exceeding the posted 
speed limit at the time of the collision. Id. 
However, there is no such duty of "extraordinary care" owed to the motoring public by the 
drivers of authorized emergency vehicles. Utah courts have made clear, the duty is one of 
"reasonable care under the circumstances." See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 620 (Utah 2000); Lee 
v. Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance, 606 P.2d 259, 261 (Utah 1980); Kouris v. UHP, 70 P.3d 72 
(Utah 2003), Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977); Martin v. Ehlers, 371 P.2d 851 (Utah 
1962). Moreover, when alleging the negligence of a police officer or other municipal employee 
while he is acting in conformity with his duties, the case is governed by the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act ("Act). Id. 
The Plaintiff takes issue in his Brief with only one section of the Act. The section at issue 
provides that Deputy Jensen and Wasatch County are immune from liability if the injury "arises out 
of, in connection with, or results from": 
The operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(15) (as amended 1996), attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum " 1 . " 
Section 41-6-14, cited in the Act, provides: 
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The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding 
to an emergency call . . . may exercise the privileges under this 
section, subject to Subsections (2) through (4). 
Id. at § 41-6-14(1) (as amended 1993), attached as Appellee's Addendum "2." "The operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle may . . . exceed the maximum speed limits . . . only when the 
operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as 
defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle. Id. at § 41-6- 14(2)(c), 
(3). The constraints of § 41-6-14 are as follows: 
(a) Every authorized emergency vehicle shall . . . be equipped with 
signal lamps mounted as high and as widely spaced laterally as 
practicable, which shall be capable of displaying to the front, two 
alternately flashing red lights... and these lights shall have sufficient 
intensity to be visible at 500 feet in normal sunlight. 
(b) A police vehicle when used as an authorized emergency vehicle 
may, but need not, be equipped with alternately flashing red light 
specified herein. 
© In addition to the alternately flashing lighting described in 
subsection (a), any authorized emergency vehicle may be equipped 
with a lighting device displaying rotating beams of red light, of red 
and white light, or red and blue light. 
M a t §41-6-132. 
Every authorized emergency vehicle shall be equipped with a siren, 
whistle or bell, capable of emitting sound audible under normal 
conditions from a distance of not less than 500 feet and of a type 
approved by the department, but such siren shall not be used except 
when such vehicle is operated in response to an emergency call... 
Mat§41-6-146(d). 
Section 41-6-14 further provides at subsection (4)(d), "the pursuit policy of the public agency 
is in conformance with standards established by the Department of Public Safety, Division of Peace 
Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum standards that shall be incorporated into 
all emergency pursuit policies adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit 
vehicles. 
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The Wasatch County Sheriffs office has drafted and adopted its Manual which provides: 
The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle 
with regard for the safety of all persons, nor protect the driver from 
the consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared 
in this section. 
Wasatch County Sheriffs Office Manual, Emergency and Pursuit Driving, § 3-3-01.02(3)(a), 
attached as Appellee's Addendum "3." R.204. 
Section 41-6-14 of the Utah Code authorizes Deputy Jensen to exceed the maximum 
speed limit when responding to an emergency, only where he travels with either the 
alternately flashing light bar across the top of his truck, or when sounding his siren. The 
evidence confirms, however, that Deputy Jensen was traveling with two visible lights, his 
overhead flashing bar, and his alternately flashing, or "wigwag," headlights, and he was 
sounding his siren. R.234(Kohler Affidavit); R.264(Kohler Deposition 12:7-10,12:23-25); 
R.100 (UHP Witness Statement of Brent L. Neering, "I was standing down by the Shop 
talking to dad when we heard sirens..."); R. 169. Mr. Knight testified the evidence supported 
the conclusion that Deputy Jensen's lights and siren were visible and audible. R167, 169 
(Knight Deposition 49:11-16, 56:19-22). 
Plaintiffs claim is basically that if Deputy Jensen had reduced his speed to 60 miles 
per hour or less, he could have stopped for the hazard created by Mr. Clegg. R. 170 (Knight 
Deposition 43:20-23). On the other hand, the evidence clearly shows that Clegg pulled into 
the eastbound travel lane of SRI 13, before the westbound lane was clear of traffic, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75, which provides: 
The operator of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway from 
any place other than another highway, shall yield the right-of-
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way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or 
crossed. 
However, Clegg asserts that his own testimony, that he neither saw the lights nor 
heard the siren, should defeat summary judgment, even though his testimony conflicts with 
his witness statement completed at the time of the accident. R.104. However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has made clear, "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence 
favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. "If the evidence 
is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Lnc, All U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). Although upon summary 
judgment the court must view all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, it may 
not assume facts for which no evidence is offered. Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA, 48 P.3d 941, 
947 (Utah 2002). "Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for 
opposing summary judgment." Id. (citing Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227-28 (1983). 
The non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial." Id. (citing Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). Clegg has offered 
nothing more than unsupported and self-serving allegations in support of his claim that he 
was unable to hear the siren or see the lights. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants. 
The Supreme Court of Utah considered this issue in Martin v. Ehlers, 371 P.2d 851, 
852 (Utah 1962). In Martin, the defendant police officer was responding to an emergency 
call, just as in this case. However, unlike this case, where Clegg had the stop sign, in Martin 
the police officer entered the intersection against the red light and plaintiff entered on a green 
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light. The police officer in Martin, like Deputy Jensen, was traveling with his lights and 
siren on. Just as in this case, two volunteer witnesses provided statements that they heard or 
saw the police officer's siren or lights. Just as in this case, Martin testified that he didn't see 
the officer's warning lights, which in the Martin case was attached to the bottom of the 
officer's windshield, rather than across the top of a truck, as in this case. And just as in this 
case, Martin testified the he didn't hear the officer's siren. Id. at 851. The court stated, "[o]ne 
of our problems is whether, under the circumstances and as a matter of law, plaintiff had the 
means of hearing but did not hear, or having heard, carelessly did not heed that which 
everyone else in the vicinity seems to have heard and heeded . . . Were we to espouse any 
theory that one is immune from his actions simply because he asserts that he did not hear 
anything as audible as a police siren within a few hundred feet at most, it would be to favor 
the hard of hearing as against the normal." Id. 
In this case, there is no dispute that Deputy Jensen's siren was working and audible 
for 500 feet. There is no dispute that Deputy Jensen's flashing and wigwag lights were on 
and visible. There is no dispute that 750 East is controlled by a stop sign, or that Clegg 
entered the eastbound travel lane of SR 113 and stopped, blocking the lane. And despite 
Clegg's uncertainty as to westbound traffic, both Deputy Jensen and volunteer witness 
Kameron Kohler both saw oncoming westbound traffic. 
The Plaintiff argues in his Brief that "Jensen's approach toward Clegg took him 
around a blind corner,"and that Clegg never entered the eastbound travel lane in his attempt 
to make a left turn across SRI 13, stating that he stopped "behind the white [fog] line.". 
Appellant's Brief at pp. 3-4. Unfortunately, these statements are not supported by the 
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evidence. Indeed, Clegg's own retained expert testified "there is no question" Clegg was 
partially blocking the eastbound lane of SRI 13, R.166 (Knight Deposition 58:6-8). The 
witness who was traveling eastbound behind the deputy testified: 
I saw a vehicle coming out and he just basically froze. He came 
out and it was like, 'oh, there's lights,' and he just stopped. But 
he stopped right in the middle of the lane the officer was going 
in. 
R.262 (Kohler Deposition 19:12-15). Moreover, the expert witnesses for both parties agreed, 
when Clegg pulled forward from the stop sign on 750 East, to the bike lane, well behind the 
travel lane of SRI 13, his visibility was 600-700 feet west along SRI 13. R.177 (Knight 
Deposition 17:3); R.151 (Probert Deposition 22:9-11). Kohler further testified: 
I know for a fact going to the left [of Clegg] would have been a 
disaster. Because when he hit the skids and went to the right, 
there were two cars coming the other way...he had to go right, 
there was two cars coming. It would have been a dead head-on. 
R.261 (Kohler Deposition 22:10-21). Deputy Jensen testified, "I had oncoming traffic from 
the other direction and wasn't able to go out around him that way to avoid a head-on 
collision." R.121 (Jensen Deposition 39:22-25). Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Clegg 
pulled onto SRI 13, partially blocking the eastbound travel lane, before the west bound lanes 
were clear for him to complete his left hand turn, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75. 
Indeed, UHP Troopers cited Clegg for the accident, for "failure to yield right of way entering 
the highway." R.094-090. 
Moreover, Clegg's own expert confirmed there was no evidence available to explain 
why Clegg could not hear the siren. R. 169 (Knight Deposition at 54:11-19; 49: 14-16). Nor 
is there an explanation for why Clegg could not see the flashing emergency lights in the "not 
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less than 300 feet"... and "well over 700 feet" prior to entering the eastbound lane of SR 113. 
R.151 (Probert Deposition at 22:3-11). 
B. Clegg's Reliance on Kouris v. UHP is Misplaced, 
Clegg' s statement in his Brief that "it is undisputed the deputy was exceeding 20 MPH 
over the posted speed limit" is completely without support and against all record evidence. 
Appellant's Brief at pg. 14. Deputy Jensen testified "the last speed I noted going down Main 
Street was around 50 miles per hour, between probably 45 and 50." R.191 (Jensen 
Deposition, 22:12-14). "Just prior to the accident, I did notice my speed, and it was between 
55 and 60 miles per hour." Id. at 23-24:25-1. Kameron Kohler testified that Deputy Jensen's 
speed was 45-50 miles per hour just prior to the accident. R.263 (Kohler Deposition 13:23-
24,14:9-12). Ron Probert testified, "I already said I thought he was going less than what the 
highway patrol calculated, ...15 over, 20 or 25...I interviewed the investigating officers and 
both Trooper Kelsey and Beveridge thought the deceleration factor was abnormally high..." 
R.150,153 (Probert Deposition 14-15:17-20; 26:6-10). Newell Knight testified that he did 
not perform an independent measurement of speed, and failed to interview the Troopers. 
R. 172 (Knight Deposition 34-35). The facts do not support Plaintiffs argument of a "logical 
and compelling inference." Appellant's Brief at pp. 14-15. 
Similarly, Plaintiff s reliance on Kouris v. UHP, 70 P.3d 72 (Utah 2003) is misplaced. 
In Kouris, the officer did not have both his lights and siren activated, nor did the Plaintiff in 
Kouris have a stop sign controlling his entry into the intersection, and there was no 
independent witness to confirm the lights were visible and the siren audible. There is nothing 
in Kouris that addresses the situation found in this case. Nor is there evidence in support of 
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Clegg' s claim that Deputy Jensen was driving recklessly, or faster than reasonable or prudent 
given the circumstances. There is also no support for the claim that Deputy Jensen exceeded 
the posted speed limit by more than 20 mph, or that such a finding is even relevant given Mr. 
Clegg's own expert testifying that any speed more than 10 miles an hour over the posted 
limit would have resulted in a collision - unless Clegg cleared the travel lane himself. 
C. Plaintiff Violated State Statutes Intended to Protect the Public, the 
Emergency Vehicle and the Victim Awaiting Emergency Attention. 
Plaintiffs self description that he is an "innocent motorist" is not borne out by the 
facts. Appellant's Brief at pg. 11. Plaintiffs description implies that he was lawfully 
blocking the roadway. However, Plaintiffs conduct violated two state statutes; statutes that 
are intended to permit the motoring public to travel with some assurance of safety from 
negligent motorists like Clegg. See Johnson v. Maynard, 342 P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1959). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75 mandates that a driver about to enter or cross a highway shall 
yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed 
and is intended to permit motorists to assume drivers like Clegg will not pull out and block 
their travel lane. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-76 requires drivers to yield the right-of-way to all 
approaching emergency vehicles. The evidence confirms that Deputy Jensen had his lights 
and siren on, and they were audible and visible. R. 100 (Statement of Brent Neering), R. 151 
Probert Deposition at 22), R.169 (Knight Deposition at 49), R.234 (Affidavit of Kameron 
Kohler), R.264 (Kohler Deposition 12:7-10, 23-25). Clegg had a clear view of the 
approaching emergency vehicle from the stop sign, and then again as he "pulled up to the 
first line of the bike path where his visibility jumped out well past 700 feet." R. 151 (Probert 
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Deposition 22:3-11). Further, there is no evidence that Clegg was not within the audible 
range of the siren. Rl 66-69 (Knight Deposition 49:11-16,56-58). Yet he pulled directly into 
the path of the oncoming emergency vehicle, before the westbound lanes had cleared, 
blocking Deputy Jensen's travel lane. Deputy Jensen left the road and crashed in the ditch, 
necessitating another officer be dispatched to the injury accident in Lake Creek. R.259 
(Kohler Deposition at 29:10-18); R.193 (Jensen Deposition at 15:13-14). The evidence 
shows the Plaintiffs conduct was the cause of the accident and not the conduct of Deputy 
Jensen. Thus, the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper and should be 
affirmed. 
D. Deputy Jensen Complied with the Provisions of the Wasatch County 
Sheriffs Office Manual on Emergency Driving. 
Mr. Clegg continues to argue that Deputy Jensen violated the provision of the 
Sheriffs Manual that forbids exceeding the posted speed limit by more than 20 miles per 
hour in any populated area or in any city. At trial, Clegg argued in his memorandum that (1) 
the Manual should be construed as a "legislative enactment or administrative regulation" and 
as such, it should be treated as "prima facie" evidence of Deputy Jensen's negligence because 
(2) "it is undisputed that the deputy was exceeding the 20 mph posted speed limit." R.290-93. 
As previously stated, the evidence available to the trial court and this Court on review 
is contrary to the position Mr. Clegg continues to cling to. That is, that Deputy Jensen was 
not exceeding the posted speed limit by 20 mph hour; that the evidence shows this position 
is irrelevant because Clegg's own expert testified that any speed greater than 60 miles per 
hour - or 10 miles an hour over the posted speed limit - would result in a collision with 
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Clegg's vehicle; that Mr. Clegg violated the law when he pulled into the road before he could 
complete his left-hand turn across the highway, creating an imminent hazard for all traffic 
on the road and for refusing to pull out of the way for an approaching emergency vehicle. 
Todd Bonner, an employee at the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office when the Manual 
was "drafted" and one of its authors, averred that his deputies are required to drive at a speed 
that is reasonable and prudent considering the existing conditions and with regard to the 
safety of all persons regardless of the posted speed limit. R.324. However, in 2002, when 
this accident occurred, the area of the Hamlet condominiums was not considered a 
"populated" area for application of the restrictions. R.324-25. Nor was it considered to be 
"in the city" as argued by the Plaintiff. R.324. Indeed, the Midway City Recorder averred 
that the area which included the Hamlet condominiums was classified as agricultural-
residential in 2002 when the accident occurred because the area was not "populated." R.416. 
This area was zoned for large lots and livestock at the time of the accident. Id. 
The Plaintiff relied exclusively on his attorney's Affidavit to argue the population 
character and density of the area, as well as the number of condominiums that were occupied 
at the time of the accident. Of course, the Plaintiff invites the Court to speculate that, 
because there was a condominium complex, it must have been occupied. He further invites 
the Court to speculate about the "number" of households in the area and the "number of 
people living" there. However, he cites to nothing but his own attorney's affidavit and 
photographs taken four years after the accident, to support his arguments. The affidavit fails 
to cite to any valid evidence in support of his arguments. 
Plaintiff makes wholly unsupported claims regarding the nature of the area, arguing 
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that its residential nature, as documented by Attorney Kevin Robson's photographs taken in 
2006, makes "clear" that it was similarly occupied in 2002. R.373. Plaintiffs conclusory 
statement regarding the population in December 2006 is plainly immaterial to the population 
of the location in 2002, as are his speculations about the number of people living within 100 
yards of where the accident occurred. Plaintiff also incorrectly argues that the area was 
zoned as commercial and residential in 2002. R.374-75. 
The evidence shows otherwise, however. According to the Midway City Recorder, 
the area was zoned agricultural-residential in 2002 and allowed large lots with livestock. 
R.324-25. How the area was zoned in 2006 is irrelevant. 
The affidavit of Kevin Robson is simply speculation by a witness-advocate and is not 
credible because it is not based on personal knowledge, skill, training, education or other 
expertise. Walker v. Rocky Mt Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973)("An 
affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions and that 
fails to state evidentiary facts, is insufficient to create an issue of fact."); Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). 
Moreover, inasmuch as the trial court granted the motion to strike the Affidavit, 
Plaintiffs arguments in his Reply memorandum were unsupported by anything other than 
speculation and conjecture, which was properly disregarded by the trial court. 
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11. THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Section 41-6-14(2) Does Not Violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Plaintiff argues that Deputy Jensen's speed was the sole cause of the accident, despite 
the evidence to the contrary, and that his recovery is improperly barred by an unconstitutional 
statutory provision enacted in 1993 and in effect for over 9 years at the time of the collision. 
However, there is no dispute the immunity for an emergency vehicle to exceed the speed 
limit, even by 10 mph, arises from the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-30-10(15).6 Subsection (15) retains immunity "if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from....the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14." Specifically applicable to this case, 
§ 41-6-14 provides that the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may exceed the 
maximum speed limits, if he sounds an audible signal (as defined in § 41-6-146), or uses a 
visual signal (as defined in § 41-6-132). Plaintiff focuses on Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14, 
arguing that this section is "unconstitutional." 
Plaintiff does not dispute that responding to an emergency is a governmental function. 
The state has defined "emergency" in this context, as a situation in which property or human 
life is in jeopardy and the prompt summoning of aid is essential to the preservation of human 
life and justifies the operator to exercise the driving privileges set forth in subsection 41-6-
6
 In 2004, the legislature repealed the Governmental Immunity Act, codified at Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp.2003). In its place, the legislature enacted the 
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, codified at Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-3Od-101 to -904 
(2004). Pursuant to the provisions of the new act, all injuries alleged to have been caused 
by a governmental entity before July 1,2004, are governed by the former act. Tindley v. Salt 
Lake City School Dist.,'116 P.3d 295, 297 n.l (Utah 2005). 
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14(2). See Utah Admin. Code R722-340-3. The applicable statute in this case was adopted 
in 1993. When amending the 1990 statute, the Senate specifically cited to the dangers and 
serious injuries sustained when drivers ignored an emergency vehicle's signals. R. 145-47 
(Senate debate, Lyle W. Hillyard, S.B. 79, 1993 General Session, "this has become a very, 
very serious problem"). Hillyard argued for enhanced penalties due to this "dangerous 
problem...but to ignore it, to leave things as they are, is probably even a greater danger." R. 
146. The bill passed unanimously. Legislative History S.B.79, enacted 1993, ch. 71, § 3. 
R. 145-47 (transcribed Senate debate). 
In considering the Plaintiffs argument that § 41-6-14 is unconstitutional, the court 
must "presume that the statute is constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown." Jones v. 
Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 94 P.3d 283, 285 (Utah 2004). "It is only when statutes 
manifestly infringe upon some constitutional provision that they can be declared void. 
'Every reasonable presumption must be indulged and every reasonable doubt resolved in 
favor of constitutionality.' " Id. (citations omitted). "Thus, the party challenging a statute's 
constitutionality bears a heavy burden of proving its invalidity." Id. 
B. Clegg's Reliance on Day v. State is Misplaced. 
The basis of Clegg's argument, is that § 41-6-14, abrogated a remedy with the 1993 
amendment, because the language imposing "a duty to operate the vehicle with regard to the 
safety of all persons" has been deleted. Clegg's argument relies on the analysis of Day v. 
State, 980 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1990). In Day, the statute at issue included an absolute immunity 
for all peace officers from any civil damages for injury caused as a result of the pursuit of a 
suspect, thus denying her a remedy that had been previously available. Id. at 1182. 
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Moreover, the court found that the legislature identified no social or economic evil 
eliminated by the abrogation of the remedy. Id. at 1187. The court went on to say, however, 
that "nowhere in this state's jurisprudence is it suggested that article I, section 11 flatly 
prohibits the legislature from altering or even abolishing certain rights that existed at 
common law." Id. at 1184. In Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985) we 
stated that the legislature may eliminate or abrogate a cause of action entirely if there is 
sufficient reason and the elimination or abrogation is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
of achieving the objective." Id. 
There is no basis for an argument that Clegg has been denied a remedy. Section 41 -6-
14 requires an agency who authorizes emergency vehicles and the attendant privileges set 
forth in its provisions, to have a policy in place that conforms with POST standards. The 
Wasatch County Sheriffs Office has such a policy, which imposes on every driver of an 
authorized emergency vehicle "a duty to operate the vehicle with regard for the safety of all 
persons." R.204. Thus, there is no basis for arguing that Clegg has been denied a remedy that 
was available to him in 1992. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has held that "whatever acts are core governmental 
functions, or are unique to government, are outside the protection of article I, section 11" of 
the Utah Constitution. Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 442 (Utah 1995); Lyon v. Burton, 5 
P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (in applying the test, "we must evaluate whether the effect of tort 
liability would promote public safety or defeat essential or core governmental activities and 
programs that are critical to the protection of public safety and welfare."). The legislature 
has also identified a clear social evil in adopting the statute at issue here. That is, the clear 
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danger associated with drivers who fail to stop for emergency vehicles and the recent 
increase in serious injuries. R. 145-47 (Legislative History S.B.79, enacted 1993, ch. 71, § 
3 (transcribed debate; R. 140-43 (2004 amendment to S.B.79, amendment to increase "require 
both audible and visual signals, a written agency policy regarding pursuit, training regarding 
the pursuit policy and another increase in penalties for those who choose to evade a police 
officer or refuse to stop"). 
In the cases cited by Clegg, Day and Kouris, those Plaintiffs entered the intersection 
legally. There was no dispute in those cases that the plaintiffs had the green light and the 
emergency vehicle entered the intersection against the red light. 
In Johnson v. Maynard, the Supreme Court of Utah stated that our traffic laws and 
lights are there to "permit the motorists to enter the intersection with some assurance of 
safety when the light is in their favor." Johnson v. Maynard, 342 P.2d 884, 886 (Utah 1959). 
Similarly, the law that mandates a driver not enter a highway until it is clear to be entered or 
crossed, is intended to permit motorists to assume drivers like Clegg will not pull out into 
their travel lane. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-75. Moreover, it is clear that Clegg also 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-76, which requires drivers to yield the right-of-way to 
approaching emergency vehicles. Thus, § 41-6-14 is constitutional as applied in this case. 
C. Section 41-6-14 Does Not Violate Art. 1, § 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiffs next argument is that denying him a remedy against Wasatch County 
offends article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution.7 In McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41 
7
 Article I, section 24 states: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
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(Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court noted that if a government entity is engaged in a 
governmental function, "the legislature is free to limit the state's liability in that area without 
implicating the constitution and its concomitant heightened scrutiny." Id. at 48. In this case, 
there is no dispute the defendants were engaged in a governmental function. The court in 
McCorvey also held that if no fundamental right arises under article I, § 11 of the 
constitution, then "the legislation's opponent has the burden of proving unconstitutionality" 
under a rational basis test. Id.; see also Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 389 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 & n. 10 (Utah 1993). "The catalog 
of fundamental interests is relatively small to date and includes such things as the right to 
vote, to procreate and to travel interstate." Tindley v. Salt Lake City SchoolDist, 116 P.3d 
295, 303 (Utah 2005). "The right to sue in tort a governmental entity engaging in a 
governmental function does not qualify as a fundamental right." Id. 
In this case, Clegg's challenge under article I, section 24 cannot be sustained. "Under 
the rational basis, or least restrictive standard of review, a statutory classification is 
constitutional unless it has no rational relationship to any reasonably conceivable legislative 
purpose." Wright, 876 P.2d at 389 (quoting Zee, 867 P.2d at 580)). An emergency vehicle, 
dispatched to provide aid to a human life in jeopardy, is essential to the preservation of life 
and justifies the operator to exercise the driving privileges set forth in subsection 41-6-14(2). 
See Utah Admin. Code R722-340-3. "It's not a perfect bill, in that it won't stop this 
dangerous problem, but we think to ignore it, to leave things as they are, is probably even a 
greater danger." Legislative History S.B.79, enacted 1993, ch. 71, § 3 (transcribed debate 
Exhibit "F" to Plaintiffs Opposition Memorandum). It is clear, there is no valid 
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constitutional argument in this case. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEVIN ROBSON WAS PROPER AND SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
A. The Affidavit of Kevin Robson was not Based on Personal Knowledge. 
Plaintiff now argues that his attorney's affidavit, the Affidavit of Kevin Robson, was 
improperly denied consideration. Appellant's Brief at pg. 17. In the Affidavit, Mr. Robson 
states that he is submitting the Affidavit because the Plaintiff was not available to aver to its 
contents. R.357. Regardless of whether the Plaintiff, or his attorney, averred to the contents 
of the Affidavit and/or the Reply Memorandum Regarding Applicability of Sheriff s Manual, 
the affidavit would fail as non-compliant with Rule 56(e). Moreover, since an affidavit is 
simply a method of placing evidence of a fact before the court, the trial court has broad 
discretion in its decision to admit or deny its contents in a civil case. In re Water Rights vs. 
Springville Municipal Corp., 982 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah 1999). 
The Affidavit of Kevin Robson avers that he has "personal knowledge" about zoning, 
the occupancy of the Hamlet, its construction phases, and its construction time tables as well 
as the population density of the area on July 16,2002. R.335-59. However, Attorney Robson 
provides no evidence regarding the area in 2002, instead offering a "Digital Globe" map and 
Midway Zoning map from October 12,2006, The Hamlet Condominium Declarations filed 
in 1996 and some photographs of Midway taken four and a half years after the accident, on 
November 29, 2006. R.357-58. However, Mr. Robson failed to establish his competence 
to testify to the meaning, application or purpose of these documents. Nor did he explain 
why, if his client was visiting The Hamlet for the purpose of obtaining real estate and title 
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business, four years later his attorney acquired "personal knowledge" that the complex was 
completed and occupied in July 2002, thus negating any available real estate business; and 
of even greater significance, how and when Mr. Robson acquired his expertise with respect 
to zoning and population in the area. Mr. Robson averred in his affidavit that he had 
personal knowledge that the zoning for the location was commercial and residential. R.358. 
However, the Midway City Recorder averred the area was "agricultural/residential" on the 
date of the accident. R.416. Further, Mr. Robson5 s interpretation of maps and Condominium 
Declarations does not serve to create a genuine issue of fact with respect to the Sheriffs 
Department's interpretation of the Sheriffs Office Manual, or whether that Manual, 
regardless of its interpretation, is applicable or relevant when the evidence does not support 
the conclusion that Deputy Jensen's speed was the cause of the collision. Mr. Robson has 
failed to establish that he has "personal knowledge" about the population density in July 
2002, or that he is otherwise competent to testify regarding the application and/or 
interpretation of the documents submitted in support of his affidavit. 
"An affidavit that merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and 
conclusions and that fails to state evidentiary facts, is insufficient to create an issue of fact." 
Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973); Williams v. Melby, 
699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985); Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). 
An affiant must establish that he or she is competent to testify to the matters stated in the 
affidavit. Id. An affidavit that is not based on personal knowledge, or where the affiant has 
failed to establish that he is competent to testify, are subject to a motion to strike. Id.; see 
alsoHowickv. Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d352,354 (Utah 1972). "This is particularly true 
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where the opposing affidavit of the plaintiff is self-serving and the testimony therein, if given 
at trial, could be disbelieved by the jury." Id. 
B. Affiant Robson Failed to Establish Any Qualification to Opine on Issues 
of Zoning or Population, 
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that a witness may qualify as an 
expert by reason of his or her knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to give 
opinion evidence regarding scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Thus, 
formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving an expert opinion, and a witness 
may qualify as an expert by virtue of his "experience [or] training." Randle v. Allen, 862 
P.2d 1329,1337 (Utah 1993) (citing Wesselv. EricksonLandscaping Co.,7ll?.2d250,253 
(Utah 1985)); see also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29,37 (Utah 1989). Robson has failed to 
provide any evidence of his "knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" in zoning, 
interpretation of the zoning maps, or application of the zoning ordinances in this case, or 
even if the material he is relying on has any application to the area as it was in 2002. Indeed, 
the zoning materials Robson references were passed or created subsequent to the accident, 
when the area was classified as residential/agricultural. R.416. 
The relevant portion of rule 56(e) states that "affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, 
D & L Supply v. Saurini, 115 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989); Creekview Apartments v. State 
Farm Ins, Co., Ill P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct.App.1989); so an affidavit which does not meet 
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the requirements of rule 56(e) is subject to a motion to strike. Howick v. Bank of Salt Lake, 
498 P.2d 352, 353-54 (1972). 
C. Robson's Affidavit Violates the Witness-Advocate Prohibition of Rule 3,7 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Kevin Robson was the attorney representing the Plaintiff in this case. R. 001 -06. Rule 
3.7(a) of the Rules of Prof. Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial 
in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) the testimony relates to an 
uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered 
in the case; or (3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the 
client." Mr. Robson's affidavit presented his personal testimony and opinion in the context 
of an expert witness. As Clegg's attorney and with no evidentiary basis, it was properly 
struck. See Watkiss & Campbell v. FOA & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1991), Salmon 
v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 894, n.2 (Utah 1996). "We deem it generally inadvisable for 
members of the bar to testify in litigation where they personally represent a party." Id. 
D. Plaintiff Did Not Oppose Defendants5 Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Kevin Robson. 
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party opposing a 
motion shall file a memorandum within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum. Rule 7(d) entitles the moving party to file a notice to submit if the nonmoving 
party fails to oppose the motion. Application of these rules is not novel or unexpected. See 
Thermidor v. Beth Israel Med. Center, 683 F.Supp., 403, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding 
failure to timely file and serve opposition to summary judgment 'constitutes an independent 
ground for granting defendant's motion."); Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2nd Cir. 
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1984) (holding "[i]n absence of a response from appellants, the district court properly 
decided appellees' motion to dismiss on the basis of their uncontroverted statement of facts 
and supporting affidavits"); see also Haycock v. Estate of Ellen S. Haycock, 2000 WL 
33244392 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (unpublished), attached hereto as Appellee's Addendum "4." 
On the contrary, they govern the timing of every pleading or motion filed in a case. 
In this case Defendants filed a motion to strike the Affidavit of Kevin Robson and any 
references to its contents in the Reply Memorandum in December 2007. R.419. The 
Plaintiff never filed an opposition or responsive memorandum. See Court Docket attached 
as Appellee's Addendum "5." Thus, Plaintiffs present argument was not preserved for 
appeal in the trial court. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996) (the 
general rule is that "issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for the first time on appeal"). 
IV. THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF CHIEF DEPUTY TODD BONNER. 
Plaintiff argues that Chief Bonner's affidavit was improperly attached to a reply 
memorandum, in violation of Utah R.Civ. P. 7(c)(1), and that it also violates Rule 56(e) by 
failing to present "specific facts." Appellant's Brief at 17. Both arguments are without 
merit. 
Chief Bonner's affidavit was attached to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memorandum ordered by the trial court on the issue regarding the applicability 
of the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office Manual. R.274-75. In his Supplemental 
Memorandum, Plaintiff argued the Manual had the force and effect of a legislative enactment 
or administrative regulation and applied to Clegg as an "innocent" motorist. R.290-92. He 
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further argued the "statutory" requirements of the Manual was "prima facie evidence" of 
Deputy Jensen's negligence. R.291. Clegg further argues the district court abused its 
discretion in admitting the evidence presented in Todd Bonner's Affidavit, because it should 
have been filed with the Defendants' original motion for summary judgment. Id. at pg. 17. 
Clegg fails to explain how the Defendants could possibly anticipate his arguments in his 
supplemental pleading, or why the Defendants memorandum opposing his argument should 
be construed as a "reply" memorandum, governed by Rule 7(c)( 1), rather than an "opposing" 
memorandum, governed by 7(c)(3)(B), or how or why the trial court is barred from 
considering the evidence contained in the affidavit regardless of Rule 7fs provisions. 
A. The Inclusion of the Affidavit of Chief Bonner in Defendants' Responsive 
Supplemental Memorandum Does Not Violate Utah R.Civ.P 7. 
Defendants' Reply to the Motion for Summary Judgment was intended to offer the 
trial court citations to the evidence that show conclusively that Deputy Jensen (1) did not 
dispute the contents of the Manual, or the 20 mph restriction, that (2) he did not exceed the 
posted speed limit by 20 mph, (3) that the 20 mph restriction was irrelevant since the 
Plaintiffs expert testified this accident would have occurred at any speed greater than 10 
mph over the speed limit, and finally, (4) the cause of the accident was Plaintiffs conduct 
and not the speed or conduct of the Deputy. R.229-52. However, the trial court found the 
response "failed to address the Plaintiffs arguments regarding the applicability of the 
Manual to Defendants' motion" and ordered supplemental briefing. R.274-75. 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum argued (1) that the Manual had the force and 
effect of a legislative or administrative enactment, that (2) the Manual defined the area of 
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SRI 13 and 750 East as "populated", that (3) it was "undisputed" Deputy Jensen violated the 
provisions of the Manual, and (4) that Clegg was an "innocent motorist." R.289-93. These 
arguments were not presented in Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants5 Motion for Summary 
Judgment and were, therefore, "new" issues that Defendants had never had an opportunity 
to address. R. 215-16,289-93. Regardless of whether the memorandum was a "reply" or an 
"opposition" memorandum, the Defendants properly responded to the new issues raised. See 
Utah RCiv.P 7(c)(3)(D). 
In its responsive memorandum, the Defendants provided the affidavit of one of the 
authors of the Manual, averring to the fact that the Manual was not a state or county statute, 
ordinance or code, that neither compliance, nor non-compliance with its provisions, was 
evidence of a deputy's negligence, or of Clegg's innocence. See Richardson v. McGriff, 762 
A.2d 48, 84 (MD. 2000); State v. Fagotto, 762 A.2d 97, 113 (Md.2000) (violation of police 
guidelines is not negligence per se, but is a factor to be considered); Martin v. Stites, 4 Fed. 
Appx. 621 (10th Cir. 2001) (a department towing policy does not, as a matter of law, amount 
to a law, regulation, or have the force and effect of law). Moreover, the authors of the 
manual did not consider the area at SRI 13 and 750 East to be "populated" for application of 
the speed restriction at the time of the accident in 2002. R.324-025. The contents of the 
Affidavit are supported by the evidence provided to Plaintiff early in the litigation.8 R.385-
8
 Plaintiffs statements in his Brief, that the Defendants' arguments are "a joke," or 
"beyond imagination," or "unbelievable" is inappropriate and offensive and not properly 
included in an appellate brief. See UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILITY, ^3; see 
also BAM. Dev., LLC. v. Salt Lake County, 87 P.3d 710, 734 (Utah Ct. App. 2004); 
Advanced Restoration, LLC v. Priskos, 126 P.3d 786, 7978 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
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93. It also confirms that the Manual was drafted to conform with the standards for 
emergency driving established by the Department of Public Safety (DPS), Peace Officers 
Standards and Training (POST), and Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-14. There is no basis for 
Plaintiffs argument that it did not comply with Rule 7, or that non-compliance bars the court 
from considering the evidence it contains. In re Water Rights vs. Springville Municipal 
Corp., 982 P.2d at 72. 
B. The Affidavit of Chief Bonner Does Not Violate Utah R.Civ.P 56(e). 
Plaintiff argues that the Affidavit of Chief Deputy Bonner includes only inadmissible 
"argument" rather than fact. Chief Deputy Todd Bonner's Affidavit clearly indicates that he 
was employed by the Wasatch County Sheriffs Office when that Office prepared the 
Manual, how and why the manual was created and how the Sheriffs Office interpreted or 
intended its terms to be applied. R.324-25. The Plaintiff presents nothing in support of his 
argument that Chief Deputy Todd Bonner is not competent or qualified to so aver. Thus the 
claim that the trial court improperly considered the affidavit is without factual or legal 
support. 
Nor does the Plaintiff present anything in support of his argument that he was denied 
an opportunity to pursue additional discovery on the issue. It was the Plaintiff, not the 
Defendants, who raised the issue of the Manual and its interpretation, in his opposition to 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment. R.214-228. By his own admission, the Manual 
was provided to the Plaintiff with Defendants' Initial Disclosures on March 17,2004. R.026, 
198-204. As were the names of the Review Board, including Todd Bonner, who determined 
Deputy Jensen's conduct did not violate its provisions. R.398,391-93. And despite two (2) 
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extensions to the discovery cutoff, Plaintiff failed to pursue this discovery. He was not 
"denied" this avenue of discovery, he failed to pursue it. Just as he failed to pursue 
depositions of the witnesses, and then requested, and was granted, an extension to depose 
witness Kameron Kohler. R.225-27, 259-69. 
There is absolutely no basis for Clegg's objection to the trial court's denial of his 
motion to strike the Affidavit of Todd Bonner, and the Defendants ask the Court to affirm 
the trial court's decision and Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants Wasatch County and Deputy Jensen respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the district court's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike Affidavit of Kevin Robson and denying Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Chief Deputy Todd Bonner. 
DATED t h i s ^ S a y of June 2008. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
ZZl/C 
HT^B. HUTTON 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees 
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APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM "1" 
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecu-
tion, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interfer-
ence with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of civil 
rights; 
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order, or similar authorization; 
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection; 
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or 
intentional; 
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; 
(8) the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
jail, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any 
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or Defining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
the clearing of fog; 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, orna tura l disasters; 
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems; 
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven in 
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14; 
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located on them; 
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public 
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement; 
(18) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or 
hazardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies; or 
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform 
any function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a or Title 73, Chapter 10 
which immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. and Forestry*' for "Board of State Lands and 
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; Forestry" in Subsection (11). 
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, The 1996 amendment by ch 159, effective 
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. July 1, 1996, added "in connection with, or 
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch. 299, results from" to the end of the introductory 
§ 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1. paragraph; deleted "or results from" from the 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in con-
Blent, effective May 1, 1995, substituted nection with" from the beginning of Subsection 
"School and Institutional Trust Lands Admin- (8); and substituted "Division of Forestry, Fire 
istration or the Division of Sovereign Lands and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign 
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APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM "2" 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 41-6-14 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.7, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1996, rewrote the intro-
1993, ch. 71, § 2; 1996, ch. 198, § 22. ductory paragraph of Subsection (6)(a). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend-
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Policy regarding vehicle 
pursuits — Applicability of traffic law to high-
way work vehicles — Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an 
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the 
law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsections (2) through 
(4). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in 
specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a vehicle pursuit, apply only when 
the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or 
uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in 
front of the vehicle. 
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle pursuit apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audible signal under 
Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle; 
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the vehicle has, in 
effect, a written policy which describes the manner and circumstances in 
which any vehicle pursuit should be conducted and terminated; 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in accordance with the 
written policy described in Subsection (4)(b); and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conformance with, 
standards established by the Department of Public Safety, Division of 
Peace Officer Standards and Training, which shall adopt minimum 
standards that shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies 
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emergency pursuit 
vehicles. 
(5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter does not 
apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while actually engaged 
in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the entire chapter applies to 
those persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L. 1955, ch. 71, § 1 repealed former § 41-6-14, 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1965, ch. Utah Code Annotated 1953, relating to applica-
83, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 4; 1987, ch. 138, § 7; bility and exemptions from act of certain driv-
1993, ch. 71, § 3. ers, and enacted present § 41-6-14.; 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
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APPELLEE'S ADDENDUM "3 
CHAPTER THREE 
3-3-00.00 EMERGENCY AND PURSUIT DRIVING 
3-3-01.00.EMERGENCY DRIVING 
3-3-01.01 Policy 
In order to respond to emergency situations safely and quickly, deputies will conduct all 
emergency driving in compliance with State Law, Determination of whether an emergency 
exists will be based on ibc statutory responsibilities of law enforcement and the reasonable 
inferences of the information known to the deputies involved. At no time will any deputy 
opcode a vehicle in an unsafe manner. 
3-3-01.02 Statutory Requirements 
(1) MThe driver of the authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an 
emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law. 
or when responding to, but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the 
privileges set forth tn this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. 
(2) The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of the chapter; 
(b) Proceed past a red light or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) Exceed the maximum speed limits if such driving docs not endanger life or 
property; 
(d) Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in 
specified direction*. 
(3) Privilege! granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle shall 
apply onfy when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6* 146. or 
uaei a vmiml signal as defined under Section 41 -6-132, which is visible from the 
front of the vehicle. 
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized engfgeflcy vehicle from the duty 10 operate the vehicle with 
regard for the safety of all persona, nor protect the driver from the 
consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges declared in this 
section." (41-6-14 UCA) 
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(b) "Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle using 
audible or visual signals under Section 41-6-14. 41-6-132.41-6-146 or of a 
peace officer lawfully using an audible or visual signal, the operator of 
every other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall immediately drive 
to a position parallel to. and as close as possible to, the right- hand edge or 
curb of the highway, clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in 
such there until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when 
directed otherwise by a police officer, This section does not relieve the 
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with 
regard for the safety of all persons using the highway." (41-6-76 UCA) 
3-3-01*03 Definition of Emergency Catta 
(1) It is clear from the responsibilities imposed on law enforcement officers by statute, 
that emergencies are those calls which require an immediate police response to a 
scene. Deputies are charged with protecting life and property. While it is 
impossible to list all situations that would constitute an emergency, they may be 
characterized by the need for an immediate police response, due to the risk of 
injury or serious property loss to a complainant or victim, or the need for 
immediate use of police skills to prevent the escape of a suspect, or preserve 
evidence to assist in the suspect's later apprehension. Respotvding deputies will act 
on the reasonable inferences of all available information. The foUowing calls would 
normally be considered as emergency calls: 
(a) 10-33 or 10-78. Officer needs assistance. 
(b) A crime against persons reported as in progress. 
(c) Injury or possible injury accidents. 
(d) A disaster requiring evacuation, crowd control, et cetera, 
(c) All pursuit driving. 
(f) Response to serious injury calls, where deputies can safely arrive before 
other medical help, 
(g) Response to the scene of major crimes where immediate arrival could 
facilitate the apprehension of the suspect, preserve evidence, ct cetera. 
3-3-01.04 Procedures 
(1) Upon determining that an emergency call exists* or after being so advised by 
dispatch or a superior, the deputy will proceed with lights and/or sirea Lights 
and/or siren will be used at all times when the deputy must use statutory 
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authorization to drive in violation of traffic regulation or needs to establish right of 
way for the emergency vehicle. All deputies in the responding vehicles will make 
sure that their seat belts are fastened. 
(2) Dispatch will be notified when any vehicle is operating 10-39, and the route* if 
other emergency vehicles are also responding. 
(3) Deputies operating I &-39 will maintain complete control over their vehicles at all 
tiroes, Use of lights and/or siren does not relieve the deputy of the responsibility to 
drive safely at all times. 
(4) Upon arriving ai the emergency scene, the deputy will determine the need for other 
units to initiate, continue, or terminate and so advise dispatch. 
(5) Deputies responding 10-39 to any emergency call will terminate such driving upon 
being advised that such response is no longer justified. 
(6) The number of cars responding 10-39 will be limited to the number of cars justified 
by the available information about the nature of the call 
34-01,05 Department Restriction! oo Emergency Driving 
(1) No deputy will drive at more than 20 MPH over the posted speed limit in any 
populated area of the county or in any city. No deputy will drive at any speed that 
is faster than is reasonable and prudent considering the existing conditions. 
(2) No deputy will drive past a school bus with flashing red lights, or through a school 
zone, as designated by flashing yellow lights, at more than 20 MPH. 
(3) Deputies will slow to below 15 MPH before entering intersections against red 
lights or traffic signs, and shall determine traffic has yielded before crossing such 
intersection. 
(4) All passing will be done on the left when possible. If the deputy must turn right 
across traffic from the left lanes, he will slow and wait until such traffic has 
yielded 
(5) Deputies will drive to minimize the effects of gravel, water, aad other similar 
objects on other vehicles and persons if traveling off of a paved roadway. 
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J-3-02.00 PURSUIT DRIVING 
3*3-02.01 Policy 
It is the responsibility of this office to attempt to bring law violators under its jurisdiction 
to justice through apprehension and identification of suspects. Pursuit driving is 
necessitated by the suspect's disregard for the law and the safety of others, and the 
responsibility charged to law enforcement officials to apprehend such persons. As in all 
police activities, concern must be exercised for the rights and safety of other persons who 
may be endangered by pursuit driving. It is the policy of this office to carefully weigh the 
risks inherent in pursuit driving and require reasonable conduct from its members, 
consistent with the legal duties of law enforcement. All pursuit driving will be conducted 
within the guidelines of this statement of Policy and Procedure* designed to promote good 
judgement and sound discretion. AD deputies have a duty to obey all relevant tradBSc laws, 
criminal statutes and office orders regarding the operation of emergency vehicles and the 
use of deadly force. 
3-3-O2.03 Initiating Pursuit 
(1) Upon initiating a pursuit, deputies will immediately engage both emergency lights 
and siren. 
(2) The deputy will then notify dispatch and will provide the following information; 
(a) Description of suspect vehicle 
(b) Number of occupants 
(c) Reason for the pursuit 
(d) Location, direction of travel and estimated speed 
(3) Dispatchers will immediately advise all other units of the pursuit 
(4) Dispatchers will immediately advise a supervisor that a pursuit is in progress. 
(5) The pursuing deputy will advise the dispatcher of each change of direction or of 
other situation changes, 
3-3-02.03 Assisting Units 
(1) Only the unit initiating the pursuit and any assigned secondary units shall pursue 
the suspect vehicle. No more than two units shall be involved in the actual pursuit 
unless assigned to do so by a supervisor. Unmarked units will abandon any pursuit 
when a marked patrol unit is in position to assume the pursuit. 
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Haycock v. Estate of Ellen S. Haycock upon excusable neglect. The trial court 
Utah App.,2000. denied Haycock's motion and Haycock 
chose not to appeal the denial. Therefore, 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT we consider only the trial court's grant of 
RULES BEFORE CITING. defendant's Motion for Summary Judg- ment. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Don H. HAYCOCK, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
ESTATE OF ELLEN S. HAYCOCK, the Adminis-
trator of this estate; Bonnie L. Kaufman, individu-
ally; and Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendant and Ap-
pellant. 
No. 990833-CA. 
Dec. 7, 2000. 
Don H. Haycock, Los Angeles, CA, pro se, Pro Hac 
Vice affiliated with Ronald Ady, Orem. 
Thomas Christensen Jr. and Douglas J. Payne, Salt 
Lake City, for appellees. 
Before JACKSON, BENCH, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
THORNE. 
* Plaintiff Don L. Haycock appeals from the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing 
plaintiffs complaint for failure to timely oppose 
defendant's motion.FN1Plaintiff appears to argue 
that the trial court's dismissal of his claim for fail-
ing to file an opposition was in error. We review 
for correctness a trial court's decision predicated 
upon failure to comply with the requirements of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Avila 
v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
FN1. Following the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment, Haycock filed a Mo-
tion to Set Aside, claiming that his failure 
to timely file an opposition was based 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that 
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made 
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response ... must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
him. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e). Further, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-501 (1)(B) entitles the mov-
ing party to file a notice to submit if the nonmoving 
party fails to oppose summary judgment within ten 
days of filing and service. Contrary to defendant's 
assertions, the application of these rules in this 
manner is neither unexpected nor novel. See Ther-
midor v. Beth Israel Med. Center, 683 F.Supp. 403, 
414 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (holding failure to timely file 
and serve opposition to summary judgment 
"constitutes an independent ground for granting de-
fendant's [summary judgment] motion"); Davidson 
v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132 (2nd Cir.1984) 
(holding u[i]n the absence of a response from ap-
pellants, the district court properly decided ap-
pellees' motion to dismiss on the basis of their un-
controverted statement of facts and supporting affi-
davits").™2 
FN2.Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is substantially similar to Rule 
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Here, defendant filed and served the summary judg-
ment motion and, after twenty-one days with no re-
sponse from plaintiff, filed a Notice to Submit for 
© 2008 ThomsonAVest. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244392 (Utah App.), 2000 UT App 347 
(Cite as: Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244392 (Utah App.)) 
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Decision. The trial court, pursuant to its authority App.), 2000 UT App 347 
under Rule 56(e), reviewed and granted defendant's 
unopposed summary judgment motion. During ap- END OF DOCUMENT 
pellate arguments Haycock asserted that, as an at-
torney Pro Hac Vice, he was unfamiliar with local 
rules and that the rules in California are not suffi-
ciently similar to Utah rules to give him notice of 
the result of his failure to timely respond. This ar-
gument is unpersuasive. 
First, Haycock's Motion to Set Aside summary 
judgment is not under consideration here. Second, a 
review of California law reveals that "[a]ny opposi-
tion to the motion shall be served and filed not less 
than 14 days preceding the noticed or continued 
hearing."Cal.Code of Civ.Pro. § 437c(b). Further, 
"opposition papers shall include a separate state-
ment which responds to each of the material facts 
contended by the moving party to be 
undisputed....Failure to comply ... may constitute a 
sufficient ground, in the court's discretion, for 
granting the motion. "Cal.Code of Civ.Pro. § 
437c(b). And more importantly, as an attorney ad-
mitted Pro Hac Vice, Haycock agreed to be gov-
erned by local rules, both substantive and procedur-
al. We conclude that the trial court did not err. 
*2 Finally, defendant requests that we sanction 
plaintiff for "blatant misrepresentations" allegedly 
made in plaintiffs brief. SeeXJtah R.App.P. 
40(b).Rule 40(b) states that "[t]he court may ... take 
appropriate action against any attorney or person 
who practices before it for ... conduct unbecoming a 
member of the Bar...."Id.We are not convinced that 
plaintiff knowingly or intentionally misrepresented 
any portion of his brief and surmise that if misrep-
resentations were in fact made they were more 
likely the product of simple incompetence. There-
fore, we deny defendant's request for sanctions. 
The trial court's decision is affirmed. 
JACKSON, A.P.J., and BENCH, J., concur. 
Utah App.,2000. 
Haycock v. Estate of Ellen S. Haycock 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2000 WL 33244392 (Utah 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - HEBER 
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE CLEGG vs. WASATCH COUNTY 
CASE NUMBER 030500422 Debt Collection 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
FRED D. HOWARD 
PARTIES 
Plaintiff - STEVE CLEGG 
Represented by: KEVIN K ROBSON 
Defendant - WASATCH COUNTY 
Represented by: LINETTE B HUTTON 
Represented by: DENNIS FLYNN 
Defendant - BRUCE T JENSEN 
Represented by: LINETTE B HUTTON 
Represented by: DENNIS FLYNN 
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09-02-03 Filed: Complaint No Amount 
09-02-03 Fee Account created Total Due: 155.00 
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CASE NUMBER 030500422 Debt Collection 
09-02-03 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 155.00 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S; Mail 
Payment; 
09-02-03 Filed: Complaint 
09-22-03 Filed return: Summons & Return of Service 
Party Served: Brent Titcomb 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: September 15, 2003 
09-22-03 Filed return: Summons & Return of Service (Bruce Travus Jensen) 
Travus Jensen 
Personal 




10-06-03 Filed: Answer 
WASATCH COUNTY 
BRUCE T JENSEN 
11-26-03 Filed: Attorney's Planning Meeting Report and Rule 26 
Scheduling Plan and Stipulated Order 
11-26-03 Filed order: Scheduling Order 
Judge DONALD J EYRE 
Signed November 26, 2 0 03 
12-08-03 Filed: Certificate of Service 
01-12-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
03-17-04 Filed: Certificate of Service Defendant's Rule 26(A)(1) 
intitial disclosures 
03-30-04 Filed: Certificate of Service Answers to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories to Defendants and Request for Documents 
03-30-04 Filed: Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and Request for 
Documents 
WASATCH COUNTY 




Notice of Deposition of Bruce T. Jensen 
Notice of Deposition of Steve Clegg 
Certificate of Service for Defendant's First Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiff. 
09-07-04 Filed: Notice of Deposition from Depomax re: Deposition of 
Bruce T. Jensen 
09-17-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
09-2 0-04 Filed: Letter from Depomax re: Steven Clegg 
10-27-04 Filed: Amended Scheduling Plan and Stipulation Order 
10-27-04 Filed order: Amended Scheduling Order 
Judge DONALD J EYRE 
Signed October 27, 2004 
12-18-04 Filed: Certificate of Service 
01-03-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Scott Tucker 
02-07-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Robert McDonald 
02-23-05 Filed: Notice of Disposition of Katie Anderson 
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03-23-05 Filed: Certificate of Service for Defendant's Second Set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to 
Plaintiff. 
04-04-05 Filed: Letter from Depomax re: Deposition of Kathy Anderson 
04-12-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Deputy Xela Thomas-Reed 
04-15-05 Filed: Certificate of Service 
05-23-05 Filed: Letter from Depomax re: Deposition of Xela Thomas Reid 
07-14-05 Filed: Certificate of Service 
10-03-05 Filed: Notice of Intent to Dismiss - copied - mailed to counsel 
10-25-05 Filed order: Attorneys* Stipulated Amended Case Management 
Order 
Judge DEREK P PULLAN 
Signed October 25, 2005 
12-06-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Ron Robert 
12-07-05 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Newell G. Knight 
01-31-06 Filed: Certificate of Service Defendants' Designation of Fact 
Witnesses 
02-22-06 Filed: Certificate of Service Defendant's Designation of Expert 
Witnesses 
05-18-06 Filed: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
05-18-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
06-29-06 Filed: Appendix to Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
Opposing Summary Judgment 
06-29-06 Filed: Memorandum of Points and Authorities Opposing Summary 
Judgment 
07-19-06 Filed: Reply Memorandum and Response to Plaintiff's Opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
09-22-06 Filed: Request to Submit Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment for Decision 
10-10-06 Minute Entry - RULING AND ORDER OF RECUSAL 
Judge: FRED D. HOWARD 
In this matter, the Court was previously the Wasatch County 
Attorney and was counsel to Wasatch County when the accident 
occurred. The Court was also a member of the Litigation Management 
Committee for the Utah Association of County Insurance Mutual. In 
the year 2002, the Utah Association of County Insurance Mutual was 
Wasatch County's insurance carrier. For these reasons, the Court 
will recuse himself as the assigned judge. The matter is referred 
to the Presiding Judge for reassignment. 
Dated this day of 
, 20 
Judge FRED D. HOWARD 
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10-10-06 Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY 
Commissioner: 
Case is assigned to Judge Fred D. Howard. 
10-10-06 Judge FRED D. HOWARD assigned. 
10-10-06 Note: File delivered to Judge Fred Howard via Cora. 
10-30-06 Filed order: Ruling Requesting Supplemental Briefing 
Judge FRED D. HOWARD 
Signed October 30, 2006 
11-13-06 Filed: Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
Opposing Summary Judgment (fax) 
11-14-06 Filed: Report from DepomaxMerit 
11-14-06 Filed: Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
Opposing Summary Judgment 
11-27-06 Filed: Response to Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum 
12-04-06 Filed: Affidavit of Kevin K. Robson 
12-04-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Todd Bonner and Portions of Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities 
12-04-06 Filed: Mortion to Strike Affidavit of Todd Bonner and Portions 
of Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities 
12-04-06 Filed: Motion and Memorandum for Leave to File Reply Memorandum 
or to Depose Todd Bonner 
12-04-06 Filed: Reply Memorandum Regarding Applicability of Sheriff's 
Manual 
12-19-06 Filed: Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Chief Deputy Todd Bonner 
12-19-06 Filed: Opposition to Plaintiff's Reply Regarding Applicability 
of Sheriff's Manual 
12-19-06 Filed: Opposition to Kevin Robson's Affidavit and Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike Robson's Affidavit 
12-21-06 Filed: Amendment to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Reply 
Regarding Applicability of Wasatch County's Sheriff's Manual 
02-09-07 Filed: Amended Motion to Strike Robson's Affidavit 
Filed by: WASATCH COUNTY, 
02-09-07 Filed: Request to Submit for Decision 
03-01-07 Notice - NOTICE for Case 030500422 ID 9551257 
ORAL ARGUMENT IN PROVO is scheduled. 
Date: 04/19/2007 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Before Judge: FRED D. HOWARD 
The Court has set aside 90 minutes to hear oral argument on the 
following motions: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
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2. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Todd Bonner and 
Portions of Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities 
3. Defendants' Motion to Strike Robson's Affidavit 
This matter will be heard in Judge Howard's regular courtroom 
located at 125 North 100 West, Provo, Utah, coutroom 202. 
03-01-07 ORAL ARGUMENT IN PROVO scheduled on April 19, 2007 at 10:30 AM 
with Judge HOWARD. 
04-19-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORAL ARGUMENT IN PROVO 
Judge: FRED D. HOWARD 
Clerk: miket 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): KEVIN K ROBSON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): LINETTE B HUTTON 
Audio 
Tape Number: 07-6-202 Tape Count: 10:31-11:54 
HEARING 
Counsel address the Court as to the following motions: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
2. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affidavit of Todd Bonner and 
Portions of Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities 
3. Defendants' Motion to Strike Robson1s Affidavit 
The Court denies Plaintiff's Motion to Strike and grants 
Defendants' Motion to Strike. The Court grants Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Ms. Hutton is to prepare the order. 
05-03-07 Filed order: Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Defendants' Motion to Strike Affdiavit of Kevin 
Robson; Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affdavit of Chief 
Deputy Bonner 
Judge FRED D. HOWARD 
Signed May 03, 2007 
05-03-07 Case Disposition is Dismsd w prejudice 
Disposition Judge is FRED D. HOWARD 
05-31-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
05-31-07 Filed: Notice of Appeal 
05-31-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 205.00 
05-31-07 APPEAL Payment Received: 205.00 
Note: Code Description: APPEAL, Mail Payment; 
07-02-07 Filed: Notice re: No Transcript 
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07-05-07 Note: FILE RETURNED TO HEBER CITY 
07-10-07 Filed: Letter from Supreme Court of Utah 
07-10-07 Filed: Order from The Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
07-27-07 Filed: Letter from Utah Court of Appeals (Case No. 20070547-CA) 
08-07-07 Note: Files #1 and #2 sent to Utah Court of Appeals attn: Celia 
Urcino 
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